Inside the Protests: What Set Iran on Edge and What Comes Next
In a volatile intervention that has further unsettled an already fragile moment in West Asia, US President Donald Trump this week claimed that Iranian authorities had “paused” government action against street agitations under international pressure. The assertion — made without evidence and swiftly dismissed by Tehran — nevertheless underscored the degree to which Iran’s internal unrest has become entangled with external signalling, psychological warfare, and the strategic messaging of rival powers.
Coming amid a brief lull in street demonstrations and heightened military alertness across the region, Trump’s remarks are best read less as a statement of fact and more as an attempt to shape perceptions — both within Iran and among its adversaries — at a moment when the Islamic Republic is facing simultaneous economic distress, domestic dissent, and sustained external coercion. Whether the protests have genuinely ebbed, or merely entered a tactical pause, remains an open question. What is clear is that Iran’s internal crisis is now inseparable from the wider confrontation it faces with the United States and Israel.
From Bazaar Protests to National Unrest
Iran has been experiencing a wave of nationwide unrest since late December 2025, in what many Western analysts have described as the most serious domestic challenge to the Islamic Republic since the 2022–23 protests. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the unrest had ended, citing four consecutive days without reported protests.
The protests initially emerged from economic grievances — sharp depreciation of the national currency and steep increases in food prices — beginning with traders in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar. The unrest quickly spread to other major cities and provincial centres. While demonstrators initially voiced economic demands, the situation escalated into violent confrontations in several locations, with clashes between protesters and security forces resulting in fatalities and hundreds of arrests. The government has not released official casualty figures.
Speaking on state broadcaster IRIB, President Masoud Pezeshkian sought to distinguish between protesters and those involved in violence. “Rioters are not protesting people,” he said. “We hear the protesters and have made every effort to solve their problems.”
Foreign Interference and the Security Narrative
Iranian authorities have increasingly framed the unrest as a security issue linked to foreign interference. President Pezeshkian accused Israel and the United States of exploiting economic grievances to destabilise the country, claiming that networks involved in Israel’s 12-day war against Iran last June were now attempting to inflame unrest by training operatives and facilitating the entry of “terrorists”.
In Israel, far-right Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu said Israeli forces had established operational groundwork inside Iran during the June attack, known as Rising Lion, adding that personnel were “operating there right now”. Israel’s Channel 14 reported that “foreign agents” had armed protesters.
Former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, also a former CIA director, fuelled these perceptions when he wrote on social media: “Happy New Year to every Iranian in the streets. Also to every Mossad agent walking beside them.”
On 12 January 2026, Iran’s Foreign Ministry summoned ambassadors from several countries, presenting video footage and documentary material purporting to show violent acts during the protests, including the use of firearms, attacks on civilians, and damage to public property, as well as incidents involving religious sites.
Sanctions, Snapback, and Economic Squeeze
Economic pressure remains central to the crisis. Iran’s economy has faced prolonged strain from US sanctions and structural weaknesses, exacerbated by inflation, currency depreciation, and declining purchasing power.
In August–September 2025, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France triggered the “snapback” mechanism under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, citing Iran’s alleged non-compliance with the JCPOA. The move re-imposed UN sanctions, prompting Tehran to curtail cooperation with the IAEA and further eroding the prospects of multilateral nuclear diplomacy. The renewed sanctions accelerated inflation and deepened economic uncertainty.
In recent weeks, the United States has imposed additional sanctions on Iranian entities and individuals. Trump has publicly floated the possibility of sweeping new trade measures, including tariffs reportedly as high as 25 per cent on remaining Iranian-linked trade channels, while repeatedly signalling that economic pressure remains “lock and loaded.”
Regional Escalation and Military Signalling
Regional tensions have compounded the crisis. In June 2025, Israeli strikes targeted Iranian military and nuclear-related facilities, killing several senior commanders. Iran retaliated with missile and drone strikes on Israel, marking a dangerous escalation.
Trump has repeatedly warned that the US remains prepared to act militarily, posting “HELP IS ON ITS WAY” while urging Iranian demonstrators to persist. He has also warned of “very strong action” if protesters are executed. Tehran has responded that it would retaliate against any attack.
Arab governments — Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Qatar — have urged Washington not to launch military action, warning of regional destabilisation and disruption to oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz, which carries roughly 20 per cent of global oil supply. Saudi officials have reportedly assured Tehran that the kingdom will not participate in or facilitate military operations against Iran.
As a precaution, the United States has begun reducing personnel at the Al-Udeid air base in Qatar. The UK has confirmed withdrawals of some British military staff, while embassies have scaled down operations and several European governments have advised their citizens to leave Iran.
What Comes Next: Containment, Not Collapse
Despite external rhetoric suggesting regime fragility, Iran’s political system has historically shown resilience under pressure. The present moment is more likely to produce managed containment than sudden collapse. The brief pause in protests may reflect tactical recalibration by both demonstrators and the state rather than resolution.
Trump’s claim about a cessation of government action appears aimed less at describing reality than at projecting influence — encouraging dissent while stopping short of overt intervention. Yet history suggests that external pressure, particularly when openly celebrated by foreign adversaries, often strengthens hardline narratives within Iran rather than weakening them.
Internally, debates will continue between factions advocating deeper alignment with China and Russia and those favouring conditional re-engagement with the West. Economically, sanctions mitigation and domestic production will remain central, but without sanctions relief, structural pressures will persist.
The greater risk lies not in immediate regime change, but in incremental escalation — miscalculation, proxy conflict, or an incident that pulls regional actors into a wider confrontation. For now, Iran’s unrest sits at the intersection of domestic discontent and geopolitical brinkmanship, with neither side able to decisively dictate outcomes.
